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Abstract While directors’ task boundaries are usually
ambiguous, some of their activities or behaviors clearly con-
stitute their formal duties, whereas others are usually perceived
as organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Applying iden-
tity theory, we present a theoretical model that demonstrates
one of the key drivers for directors to engage in OCB with a
focus on their role identity. We argue that an individual direc-
tor’s role identity is one of the key factors that motivate direc-
tors to engage in OCB. Furthermore, we propose that two
board-level contingencies, board capital, and informal board
hierarchy order, can moderate the effect of directors’ role-
identity salience on their OCB. That is, low levels of board
capital and directors’ higher positions in a board’s informal
hierarchy enhance directors’ motivation to engage in OCB.
Keywords Board capital  Board informal hierarchy 
Board of directors  Director identity  Organization
citizenship behavior
‘‘But by far the best way to make sure you have an
awesome board is to start by having awesome board
members’’. Matt Blumberg (CEO of Return Path)
‘‘Many of our directors agreed that when they were
starting out on their boards, they could have benefited
from more help from standing directors’’. (Finkel-
stein and Mooney 2003, p. 109)
‘‘Some directors are willing to take on the profes-
sional risk and help lead the firm out of crisis’’.
(Withers et al. 2012, p. 836)
‘‘If I see Leo [Apotheker, a fellow board member and
the head of customer operations] doing a great job, I
say, ‘Wow, great!’ I am quite willing to subordinate
some of my own priorities to help him achieve the
common goal’’. (Doz and Kosonen 2007, p. 101)
Introduction
The benefits of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)
are acknowledged in organizational studies. OCB refers to
‘‘individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or
explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that
in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the
organization’’ (Organ 1988, p. 4). Research has found that
individual engagement in OCB can increase knowledge
sharing and job performance (Lin 2008; Wei 2014),
enhance team and group cohesiveness (Lin and Peng 2010;
Podsakoff and MacKenzie 1997), contribute to the overall
effectiveness of management and the organization (Pod-
sakoff et al. 1997; Rego and Cunha 2008), and conse-
quently improve both the financial and non-financial
performance of firms (Koys 2001; Organ 1990; Ryan
2002). Without OCB, a work group may not be able to
achieve its performance goals, and the organization may
lose its competitive advantage.
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However, research on OCB is new in the boardroom
governance literature. The antecedents and outcomes of
OCB in board members have not been explored in the
literature, and research has not examined the contingency
factors that may influence these relationships. A possible
explanation is that the job description of corporate directors
is often broad and ambiguous (He and Huang 2011). For
instance, directors are responsible for monitoring man-
agerial decision making and are expected to provide advice
to management (Hillman and Dalziel 2003); the manner in
which they are required to fulfill such tasks is difficult to
specify. As with other types of employees and profes-
sionals, some of the tasks and activities of directors, such
as attending board meetings and serving on board com-
mittees, are clearly defined in their job description.1 In
contrast, other activities are more discretionary in nature,
and not engaging in such activities does not generally lead
to explicit punishment. It is acknowledged that directors
perform their ‘‘hard-to-measure’’ duties only a few times a
year; however, we argue that this makes engagement in
OCB even more important when differentiating between an
effective board and an ineffective board. Studies by Bell
(1993) and Preston and Brown (2004) suggest that helping
other board members, volunteering one’s time on extra
duties, or committing to responsible trusteeship can
improve the governance capability of a board, which in
turn leads to a better functioning board. Thus, OCB is not
only a management issue but also a governance issue that
requires further examination.
Taking the first step to explore this issue, we begin by
developing a conceptual framework that integrates role-
identity theory and the OCB literature to emphasize the
following: (1) individual-level role identity that may affect
a director’s motivation to engage in OCB and (2) board-
level structural dimensions that may alter the strength of a
director’s motivation to engage in OCB. Extending role-
identity theory, we argue that the ‘‘role-identity’’ and ‘‘role-
identity alignment’’ of an individual director play impor-
tant roles in influencing his or her motivation to engage in
OCB. Directors are individuals with different role config-
urations because many of them are knowledgeable pro-
fessionals who often have multiple roles and positions in
addition to a board position in an organization. Hence, their
different role identities can influence their behavior in
executing their role and responsibilities as a director.
Further, the likelihood of a director being engaged in OCB
is contingent upon board-level characteristics because the
board of directors functions as a group. In particular,
following the literature on board structure, we argue that
‘‘board capital’’ and ‘‘informal board hierarchy order’’ can
affect a director’s degree of willingness to engage in OCB,
thereby moderating the likelihood of the director’s
engagement in OCB.
This conceptual paper contributes to the board literature
in three ways. First, by extending the research on director
identity and behavior (Hillman et al. 2008; Withers et al.
2012), this paper explores a new behavioral dimension of
directors—OCB. Several studies have reported the pres-
ence of some form of OCB by directors in organizations.
For example, Withers et al. (2012) argue that some direc-
tors stay with an organization to help it during a corporate
crisis. Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) report that some
board members use different face-saving strategies to
promote the effective governance of an organization.
However, there is a lack of clear understanding of why
some directors engage in OCB while others do not. By
developing a theoretical framework of directors’ OCB, this
paper not only advances research on director identity but
also highlights the importance of OCB in board research.
Second, by combining the board structure literature, this
paper responds to the recent call for research on the mul-
tilevel nature of boards, as ‘‘individuals are nested within
subgroups that are in turn nested within the broader board
as a whole’’ (Johnson et al. 2013, p. 246). Focusing on two
important board structural dimensions, we examine board
capital and informal board hierarchy order as possible
influences on directors’ motivation to engage in OCB.
While prior research theorizes that board capital affects
strategic decisions and performance (see Johnson et al.
2013), we contend that the level of board capital affects the
extent of the gaps for board members to fill by going
beyond the minimally required duties, including engaging
in OCB. The informal board hierarchy order can affect the
expectation and effort norms for directors who are rela-
tively senior on the board (He and Huang 2011), and this
effect is in turn likely to influence their motivation to
engage in OCB. By incorporating boardroom contingencies
that may affect directors’ motivation to engage in OCB,
this paper also attempts to explain why the same director
engages in OCB in one organization but not in another.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature by going
beyond the models that rely on proxy factors such as
directors’ backgrounds, including board tenure, profes-
sional experience, and age, as well as financial compen-
sation to explore their motivations to contribute to board
effectiveness. It is likely that directors have a variety of
motivations for accepting corporate directorships (Ham-
brick et al. 2008); some board members are intrinsically
rather than extrinsically motivated to serve the board. Our
model focuses on their OCB, which by definition consti-
tutes intrinsically motivated actions because directors
1 See recent job descriptions for non-executive directors advertised
on Financial Times and Indeed for companies such as InCommunities
and the International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA)
(accessed on 5 June 2015).
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engage in OCB without any expectation of tangible
rewards. The development of a framework for directors’
OCB can enable boards to identify and recruit suitable
candidates to contribute to the vitality and effective per-
formance of the board, thereby contributing positively to
the organization.
This paper is organized as follows. We first discuss
directors’ OCB by presenting prior studies on this issue.
We then present our theory on the effect of directors’ role-
identity salience and role identity overlapping with OCB.
Subsequently, we discuss the moderating effects of board-
level characteristics. The paper concludes with a discussion
of the theoretical implications of our proposed model,
managerial implications, limitations, and a possible future
research agenda.
OCB in the Boardroom
According to Organ (1988), two key characteristics of an
individual’s OCB are that it is ‘‘discretionary’’ and ‘‘not
rewarded by the formal system’’. In later developments of
OCB theories, many scholars have argued that although it
is discretionary, OCB may be perceived as an ‘‘expected’’
part of the job of employees. This argument informs the
debate on OCB in the context of in-role and extra-role
behaviors, but it also acknowledges that the distinctions
between OCB and in-role behavior are relatively hard to
draw (Allen and Rush 1998; Morrison 1994; Podsakoff
et al. 2000; Van Dyne et al. 1995). Furthermore, Organ
(1988, 1997) argues that in-role behavior, extra-role
behavior, and the distinctions between the two are not good
alternative explanations for OCB because human behaviors
are neither fixed nor unchangeable over time (Van Dyne
et al. 1995). The distinction between in-role and extra-role
behaviors among full-time employees in a typical working
environment already lacks clarity, but it will be even more
unclear with non-executive (‘‘outside’’) board directors2
who work on a part-time basis with a job description that is
both ‘‘general and ambiguous’’ (He and Huang 2011,
p. 1211). Therefore, we adopt the OCB construct to discuss
outside directors’ boardroom behaviors and consider OCB
to include behaviors ‘‘that are relatively more likely to be
discretionary, and relatively less likely to be formally or
explicitly rewarded in the organization’’ (Podsakoff et al.
2000, p. 549).
Key Dimensions of OCB in the Boardroom
Although OCB is a multi-dimensional construct, there is a
little consensus regarding the multiple dimensions of OCB.
For instance, Organ (1988) initially identifies five key OCB
dimensions (i.e., altruism, conscientiousness, sportsman-
ship, civic virtue, courtesy), but Organ (1997) subsequently
acknowledges that there is some confusion about certain
dimensions, such as altruism and conscientiousness. Fur-
thermore, a comprehensive review of OCB literature con-
ducted by Podsakoff et al. (2000) reports that there are
nearly 30 different dimensions identified, although some
similarities and overlapping are found among some of
these dimensions. Based on conceptual overlapping, the
researchers have carefully consolidated these multiple
dimensions into seven key dimensions that capture OCB:
(1) helping behavior, (2) sportsmanship, (3) organizational
loyalty, (4) organizational compliance, (5) individual ini-
tiative, (6) civic virtue, and (7) self-development. By
showing the relevance of OCB in the board context, we
adopt these relatively well-clarified seven dimensions and
identify how these dimensions can apply to the boardroom.
Helping behavior typically includes voluntarily helping
other members of an organization and preventing the
development of problems for other members (Organ 1988,
1990). In the boardroom context, helping behavior can be
seen as the individual director helping other members and/
or the board by engaging in ‘‘other-serving’’ behavior. For
example, a director can help a board environment to
become more conducive to open discussion or help other
board members to provide resources more effectively.
Research by Preston and Brown (2004, p. 227) suggests
that providing assistance where needed is a typical type of
directors’ OCB, which ‘‘may entail chairing a committee,
mentoring a new board member, or volunteering to help
address operational issues of the organization’’.
Sportsmanship includes a person’s willingness to toler-
ate or accept inconveniences and to maintain a positive
attitude even if their opinions or suggestions may not be
accepted by others (Organ 1990). Although discretional, in
the boardroom context, it is important for directors to
demonstrate sportsmanship because this positive attitude
help to promote a board environment that is constructive
and not distracted by interpersonal conflict. Research has
suggested that an effective board often maintains a positive
decision-making culture supported by its members (Huse
2005), and outside directors should be ‘challenging but
supportive’ and ‘independent but involved’ (Roberts et al.
2005, p. 6). Similarly, Finkelstein and Mooney (2003,
p. 104) note that ‘‘Directors can have strong views, and
when they are not balanced with a degree of tolerance and
open-mindedness, they can disrupt how the board works
together’’.
2 While the board literature (e.g., Yoshikawa et al., 2014; Zajac and
Westphal, 1996) commonly uses the term ‘outside directors’, Higgs
Review (2003, p. 6.19) notes that ‘‘‘Outside director’ is a term used in
the US and elsewhere but it is not widely recognized in the UK’’. For
the sake of convenience, this study considers outside directors to be
both non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors
because they are appointed to perform the same director duties.
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Organizational loyalty involves promoting an organi-
zation to external parties and remaining committed to the
organization even under difficult conditions (Podsakoff
et al. 2000). Although organizational loyalty is not
expected from outside directors, it is not uncommon to find
that some directors exhibit loyal behavior to the board and
organization they serve. For example, Withers et al.’s
(2012) study of firms facing organizational crisis reports
that rather than resigning, some directors are willing to
remain on the board and assist the organization through a
crisis. This type of organizational loyalty behavior is also
found in other studies of corporate boards (e.g., Lorsch and
MacIver 1989).
Organizational compliance includes acceptance of an
organization’s rules and procedures by internalizing them
(Borman and Motowidlo 1993). Compared with other
dimensions of OCB, we argue that organizational compli-
ance is the weakest indication of directors’ OCB because
organizational compliance is often regarded as an expected
part of directors’ duties. For example, the International
Women’s Development Agency (IWDA) advertised a
position description for outside directors who need to ‘‘act
in the best interests of IWDA as a whole, irrespective of
personal, professional, commercial or other interests, loy-
alties or affiliations and in compliance with the Australian
Council for International Development (ACFID) code of
conduct. Also, appointed directors are expected to comply
with their obligations under relevant laws and IWDA’s
policies’’ (IWDA 2015, p. 2). Although this dimension is
more likely to be expected from directors, we argue that it
is possible that the extent of compliance with (or deviation
from) organizational rules and procedures may vary among
directors. In other words, directors can demonstrate their
discretion through the degree of such engagement (i.e., far
beyond formal requirements).
Individual initiative involves performing one’s task at a
level that is far beyond formal requirements (Podsakoff
et al. 2000). Directors’ individual initiative usually
involves voluntary behavior that can have a positive effect
on the board environment and can thereby inspire other
directors to improve their task performance. Finkelstein
and Mooney (2003, p. 111) note that ‘‘If we really believe
that boards are groups […] it starts with directors who
encourage facilitation techniques that can promote greater
director involvement and debate’’. In addition, these
researchers suggest that asking CEOs probing and big-
picture questions is an initiative that directors should
consider to make good use of board meetings.
Civic virtue entails involvement in and commitment to
the organization as a whole and involves such activities as
participation in the organization’s governance and ensuring
vigilance to protect its interests (Organ 1988; Podsakoff
et al. 2000). Civic virtue is highly relevant to the moni-
toring and resource provision roles of directors, whose
active engagement in such behavior can help safeguard and
maximize an organization’s value. For instance, a position
description for outside directors from InCommunities states
that ‘‘it is looking for dynamic, committed and motivated
people to join its board […] able to uphold the highest
standards of accountability with integrity and good gov-
ernance’’. Likewise, AICD (2011, p. 3) suggests that
directors’ personal competencies include ‘‘Integrity—ful-
filling a director’s duties and responsibilities, acting ethi-
cally, appropriate independence, putting the organisation’s
interests before personal interests; […] and an active con-
tributor with genuine interest in the organization and its
business’’. Although research on board governance has
largely indicated the importance of directors’ engagement
in this dimension (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Kroll et al.
2008), it is clear that the degree of such engagement may
vary quite significantly among individual directors.
Finally, self-development includes such activities as vol-
untary actions to improve one’s skills and abilities to perform
tasks (George and Brief 1992). In the board context, self-
development is not necessarily expected, but it is often viewed
as a preferred behavior of directors to enable them to effec-
tively perform their monitoring and resource provision roles.
Further, organizations such as Coca-Cola actively promote
directors’ self-development behavior. Coca-Cola’s (2013,
p. 5) guidelines to the board of directors state that ‘‘Continuing
director education […] each director is expected to take rea-
sonable steps to remain current in his or her professional
development, including attendance at periodic corporate
governance seminars or meetings and review of pertinent
governance publications, recognizing that the amount and
form of professional development needs may vary depending
on each director’s circumstances’’. However, Coca-Cola
(2013) also understands that the degree of such engagement
may vary depending on individual directors.
In sum, directors’ OCB is one scale construct that
consists of seven dimensions in the board context. It is
possible that some of these dimensions are more com-
monly practiced by some directors than by others. Fur-
thermore, these dimensions of OCB are not mutually
exclusive; rather, they can sometimes be reinforcing. That
is, one OCB dimension is closely related to the other
(e.g., helping behavior and organizational loyalty), and
directors may exhibit multiple OCBs at the same time.
Notably, these different dimensions help explain what
OCB consists of in the board context, and the integration
of these dimensions explains the degree of directors’
engagement in OCB.
T. Yoshikawa, H. W. Hu
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OCB Framework: Directors’ Role Identity
and Alignment
There are some unique characteristics of individual direc-
tors that differ from the characteristics of other profes-
sionals. The board as a group reflects this uniqueness.
Many directors are outsiders of the organization who are
affiliated with another organization, often on a full-time
basis, and their board membership is a part-time position.
Some directors also have multiple board positions as an
outside director. Hence, directors often have another pro-
fessional role outside of the boardroom. Although the
board functions as a group, its members do not work
together on a continual basis. Directors meet and interact
with other directors when there are board meetings and
committee meetings (if they also sit on the same board
committees). This clearly differs from other types of work-
related groups or teams because the frequency of directors’
interaction is much more limited. Such characteristics of
board members mean that our focus on directors’ multiple
role identities is closely related to their engagement in
OCB.
Director’s Role Identity
Role-identity theorists argue that with the multiple roles
that people encounter, their behaviors are guided by the
most salient role that provides greater meaning to help
them define ‘‘who I am’’ (Thoits 1991, 1992). Likewise,
Welbourne et al. (1998, p. 542) note that ‘‘the more
meaning we derive from a role, the greater the behavioral
guidance that ultimately leads to the enactment of behav-
iors associated with that role’’. In the boardroom context,
many outside directors (hereafter, outsiders) often hold
other professional roles. These outsiders are frequently
selected precisely because they have expertise, experience,
and knowledge in these other roles, which are often their
primary occupations (e.g., as a CEO of another organiza-
tion or as a banker, lawyer, or accountant). This charac-
terization implies that the professional role identity of
many directors is derived from their primary occupation
and their director role identity (DRI) is based on their
board position. This also suggests that their boardroom
behavior may be guided by these multiple identities,
especially the extent to which each director identifies him/
herself as a director even when the board position is his or
her part-time position. Comparing DRI and professional
role identity, we argue that a director’s DRI is one of the
key motivators to engage in OCB because this identity
influences the degree of commitment to the director role
(Serpe 1987; Serpe and Stryker 1987). While the specific
roles and responsibilities of directors may vary in
accordance with their country of origin, a director’s pri-
mary duty is generally to safeguard the interests of the firm
and its shareholders. Furthermore, a director’s fiduciary
duties often involve strict obligations of ‘‘fidelity, loyalty,
trust and confidence’’ (Cole 2012, p. 46).3 Hillman et al.
(2008) suggest that a director who strongly identifies with
the director role is more likely to engage in his or her
duties. That is, such a director will be more willing to
commit his or her time and efforts to fulfill the monitoring
and resource provision roles and will likely be motivated to
maintain a reputation as a competent director. As engage-
ment in OCB means going beyond one’s in-role duties, we
expect that a director’s strong identification with his or her
director role is an important antecedent of the director’s
OCB. Because OCB is a discretionary behavior that is not
necessarily formally rewarded, one who engages in such
behavior is usually strongly committed to the group to
which s/he belongs. Hence, if a director’s DRI is strong,
s/he would be more inclined to learn and identify areas for
improving the board’s effectiveness, and consequently, the
director would be more willing to engage in a great deal of
OCB to enhance the overall performance of the board. In
contrast, a director with weak identification as a director
would likely be less interested in engaging in ‘‘other-
serving’’ behaviors such as OCB. Such a director likely
treats the director role as secondary to his or her primary
professional role and is rather passive even in fulfilling his
or her board duties (Hillman et al. 2008) and more passive
in engaging in OCB. Therefore, we argue that a director’s
OCB engagement level is affected by the degree of DRI. In
summary, we present the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The degree of a director’s engagement in
OCB is affected by his or her DRI such that a director with
stronger DRI will be more motivated to engage in OCB.
Director’s Role-Identity Alignment
The extent of alignment in directors’ professional and
director roles likely varies significantly among individuals.
The alignment of multiple roles can occur as a result of the
convergence of interests, values, goals, norms, and task
content for those role identities (Ashforth et al. 2008), and
similar behaviors or set of activities may be required to
serve those interests and goals. In other words, overlaps in
those dimensions likely facilitate the alignment of different
3 For instance, according to the UK’s Corporate Governance Code
(2014) and Companies Act (2006, Clauses 170–177), the general
duties of a director include ‘‘to act within powers; to promote the
success of the company; to exercise independent judgment; to
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence; to avoid conflicts of
interest; not to accept benefits from third parties; and to declare
interest in proposed transaction or arrangement’’.
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role identities. In such cases, role boundaries are expected
to be more impermeable. When there is a conflict or
misalignment between multiple role identities, a director’s
motivation to fulfill his or her board duties and further
engage in OCB may be negatively affected. However, the
presence of role identity conflict is a matter of extent rather
than binary, and many individuals often face minor conflict
in their multiple role identities (Ashforth et al. 2008).
Nevertheless, identity conflict is likely to create a disin-
centive to perform one’s role (Hillman et al. 2008), usually
the secondary or less salient role.
Outside directors are appointed based on their expertise
and knowledge in their other professional positions that are
valuable to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). They are
capable individuals who are expected to use their ‘‘exter-
nal’’ knowledge and resources when they serve as director.
However, the extent to which these directors can leverage
their knowledge and experience from their other profes-
sional roles in their director role likely varies. Furthermore,
norms, goals, values, and task content in their professional
roles may be quite different from their director role. This
implies that while outsiders’ multiple roles are not clearly
segmented (or impermeable), at least in some cases, some
components of their roles are more clearly segmented than
in other cases. For example, a director who is a corporate
lawyer as a full-time profession may find his or her director
role aligned because the director is expected to use his or
her legal knowledge in both the director and professional
roles to serve corporate interests. In contrast, an outsider
who is a scientist is usually interested in knowledge cre-
ation and innovation. This professional role may not align
with his or her director role, which emphasizes shareholder
value maximization that may occur at the expense of
innovation. Therefore, the alignment between the scien-
tist’s director and professional roles is likely weak as a
result of differing goals.
When role-identity alignment occurs, the permeability
of the overlapped roles increases, which promotes the
importance of both roles to an individual (Lynch 2007).
Simply put, the alignment of a director’s professional and
director role identities will likely increase the director’s
effectiveness (Hillman et al. 2008) because s/he has a
stronger commitment and motivation to serve the board.
Therefore, we propose that the role-identity alignment
between the professional and director roles enhances a
director’s engagement in OCB.
Proposition 2 The degree of a director’s engagement in
OCB is affected by the alignment of the professional role
identity and DRI such that a director with greater role-
identity alignment will be more motivated to engage in
OCB.
Board-Level Dimensions as Moderators
While individuals’ role-identity salience and overlapping
are important drivers of their OCB, directors are also
members of the board and function as a group, and the
characteristics of the board may have a profound effect on
individual directors’ behavior. This effect occurs because
when nested in a group (the board), directors’ OCB may
depend on the particular board on which they sit. This
interactive nature between directors and the board is well
acknowledged in the board governance literature (see Boyd
et al. 2011; Dalton and Dalton 2011). Supporting this view,
recent research has called for exploration of the potential
interaction between board structure and the director iden-
tity-behavior link (Withers et al. 2012). In practice, it is not
uncommon to find the same director behaving differently
on different boards or even behaving differently on the
same board when the board structure changes (Finkelstein
and Mooney 2003).
The OCB logic suggests that a director’s OCB is pre-
sented, when a director performs duties beyond the expec-
ted level on the basis of a set level of formal reward.
However, researchers have shown that in the boardroom
context, the expectations of directors in relation to per-
forming their duties vary across different boards (Cole
2012; Forbes and Milliken 1999; Minichilli et al. 2012). In
other words, while a director’s OCB is intrinsically moti-
vated, the degree of his or her OCB engagement may be
altered by the perceived ‘‘expectation’’ of the director from
a particular board. Subsequently, considering the structural
aspect and focusing on the level of expected effort at the
board level, we identify two key dimensions-board capital
and informal board hierarchy order-to explain the possible
variation in directors’ OCB in different organizations.
Board Capital
Board capital refers to ‘‘the sum of individual director’s
human and social capital, which represents the ability of a
board to provide resources to the firm’’ (Haynes and Hill-
man 2010, p. 1146; see also Hillman and Dalziel 2003).
Board capital enables the board to effectively address a
variety of managerial and strategic issues, which usually
entail multiple dimensions such as strategic, financial,
legal, and marketing dimensions. Hence, the level of board
capital that a board possesses becomes important in
determining the degree of effort the board expects from its
individual members.
According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003), board capital
is the major prerequisite of a board’s resource provision
to an organization. While board members with external
T. Yoshikawa, H. W. Hu
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ties are able to access valuable resources for the focal
organization from external sources from a resource
dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the
extent of their commitment to do so may vary depending
on the level of board capital. When a board has a great
deal of human and social capital provided by its members,
the board can gather critical resources from its current
pool of members and can become more capable of han-
dling various board issues. Hence, in boards with rich
capital, the level of expectation from individual board
members can be relatively low, and directors’ OCB may
not be in great demand. In contrast, when a board has a
relatively low level of board capital, it may not have
sufficient capacity to make important decisions. In that
situation, the board may have a greater expectation that
its members will access their external networks to obtain
necessary resources or help coordinate board tasks with
limited resources to handle each decision. In such boards,
directors’ motivation to engage in OCB might be
enhanced because they foresee that more assistance and
effort are expected from them and are therefore more
willing to perform helpful behaviors for other members
and the board.
Thus, we argue that board capital can affect directors’
OCB engagement because directors perceive a board that is
low on capital and relies on them for resources, advice, and
support, thereby strengthening their motivation to engage
in OCB. Consequently, we propose that board capital is an
important contingency factor for directors’ OCB and that
directors’ DRI and OCB relationship is adversely affected
by board capital.
A similar argument is expected for the moderating effect
of board capital on the relationship between directors’ role
alignment and their engagement in OCB. We suggested
earlier that the alignment of directors’ multiple identities,
including their professional and director identities, would
likely enhance their commitment to their board role and
thereby increase their motivation to engage in OCB.
However, the level of expectation for directors to make
extra efforts beyond their formal board duties will likely
decline when a board has rich capital in terms of profes-
sional expertise, knowledge, experience, and social ties.
Hence, the positive impact of identity alignment will be
mitigated by rich board capital. We therefore present the
following propositions.
Proposition 3a The positive relationship between a
director’s DRI and the degree of OCB engagement is
weakened as board capital increases.
Proposition 3b The positive relationship between the
alignment of a director’s professional role identity and DRI
and the degree of OCB engagement is weakened as board
capital increases.
Informal Board Hierarchy Order
An informal hierarchy denotes an implicit board structure
that can influence the effectiveness of interactions among
board members. According to He and Huang (2011,
p. 1121), an informal board hierarchy is developed based
on ‘‘differentiation in the deference that directors give and
receive’’. Board informal hierarchy functions as a ‘‘coor-
dinating mechanism’’ in which board members have a clear
understanding of one another’s standing within the board
and provide input accordingly (He and Huang 2011; Magee
and Galinsky 2008; Tam and Hu 2006).
The identification of one’s seniority on a board can be
quite straightforward (Finkelstein and Mooney 2003). The
seniority of a board member can usually be signaled by
factors such as being viewed as having a wider scope of
knowledge, experience, and networks external to the
organization or being well respected within the industry,
perhaps including sitting on multiple boards, especially the
boards of large, reputable organizations (Johnson et al.
2013). Forbes and Milliken (1999, p. 495) note that the
effective use of knowledge and skills on a board is a
‘‘heedful interrelating’’ and ‘‘collective learning’’ process
among board members. To facilitate this process, the
informal hierarchy of a board becomes central. That is, in
understanding the order of seniority on the board, directors
can be more aware of the expectations for their service in
relation to others and can discern when their service con-
tribution to the board is needed.
Consequently, we argue that the order of a board’s
informal hierarchy can have a positive effect on directors’
perception of the level of OCB effort that is expected from
them. For example, when a director is relatively senior
within the informal hierarchy of the board and is aware of
areas to which s/he can contribute, the higher level of
expected effort to assist others will positively boost their
voluntary engagement in OCB. In contrast, a director who
is relatively junior on the board may find that OCB activity
is less expected from them because there are more senior
directors on the board. As such, OCB assistance from
junior members may not be perceived as greatly necessary,
and the level of expected effort from them may be low. To
address this gap between the director’s role-identity moti-
vation in OCB engagement and self-perceived low expec-
tations, the director may be less motivated to engage in
OCB. Therefore, we argue that while a director’s role-
identity salience affects his or her motivation to engage in
OCB, the seniority order within the informal board hier-
archy affects this relationship.
The positive motivational effect of the alignment of a
director’s professional role identity and his or her DRI is
likely to be affected by informal board hierarchy order in a
similar way. A director’s motivation to engage in OCB as a
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result of the alignment of a director’s professional role
identity and his or her DRI will likely be intensified, when
the director is positioned at a higher level in the board
informal hierarchical order because of the identity align-
ment and the higher level position. In other words, a pos-
itive effect of role identity alignment is further enhanced
by a positive effect of the director’s self-perceived high
expectation to serve the board more through OCB. Hence,
we present the following propositions.
Proposition 4a The positive relationship between a
director’s DRI and the degree of OCB engagement is
strengthened as his or her position in the informal board
hierarchy increases.
Proposition 4b The positive relationship between the
alignment of a director’s professional role identity and DRI
and the degree of OCB engagement is strengthened as his
or her position in the informal board hierarchy increases.
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual framework discussed in
the propositions above.
Discussion and Conclusions
A director’s task boundaries are usually ambiguous, espe-
cially compared with other professions. However, even for
directors on a board, some activities or behaviors clearly
constitute their formal duties, while others are usually
perceived as OCB because directors will not be rewarded
for engaging in such activities. Similarly, even for their
formal board duties and activities, such as attending board
meetings and participating in discussions, some directors
may perform far beyond the expected level. Our theoretical
model focuses on role identity in an attempt to demonstrate
one of the key drivers for directors to engage in OCB.
Specifically, we focus on an individual director’s role
identity (DRI) to advance our understanding of directors’
OCB.
We argue that DRI is one of the key factors that moti-
vate directors to engage in OCB. We theorize that a high
level of DRI motivates directors not only to fulfill their
board duties but also to engage voluntarily in ‘‘other-
serving’’ behaviors. We further propose that a director’s
role identities as a director and as a professional in another
position are sometimes aligned because these roles share
common values, norms, task content, and goals, and hence
are not always clearly segmented. We contend that such
aligned role identities can motivate directors to engage in
OCB. By linking directors’ role identity to OCB, we extend
the prior research on directors’ role identity (e.g., Golden-
Biddle and Rao 1997; Hillman et al. 2008; Withers et al.
2012) and attempt to make a contribution to the literature.
In addition, we have discussed two board-level contin-
gencies, board capital, and informal board hierarchy order,
which may moderate the effect of directors’ role identity on
their OCB. We argue that low levels of board capital
enhance directors’ motivation to engage in OCB because
directors sense that a board with limited capital is likely to
rely on them for greater support. We also theorize that
directors in higher positions in a board’s informal hierarchy
are likely to engage in OCB because of the expectation that
such individuals should exert greater effort. In sum, some
board-level factors can influence the effect of directors’
role identities on their OCB.
Theoretical Contributions
Our theoretical model advances the corporate governance
and board research in several ways. First, this study con-
tributes to the board literature by extending the research on
director identity (Hillman et al. 2008; Withers et al. 2012).
Specifically, this paper explores a new behavioral
Board Capital
Role Identity
OCB
Informal Board 
Hierarchy Order 
Role-Identity 
Alignment
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework of directors’ OCB in the boardroom
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dimension of directors (i.e., OCB). Although Withers et al.
(2012) explore directors’ helping behavior during an
organizational crisis, prior research does not specifically
focus on directors’ OCB or discretionary behaviors,
although such behavior likely help to improve board
effectiveness. Given the ambiguity of directors’ task
boundaries and the self-motivated nature of OCB engage-
ment, we believe that a theoretical model that systemati-
cally discusses the effects of directors’ role identities on
their OCB has important implications for board
effectiveness.
Second, we advance the understanding of directors’
motivations to contribute to the board by engaging in OCB.
Prior research usually uses proxy variables such as direc-
tors’ tenure, experience, and financial compensation to
explore effects on board effectiveness or organizational
performance. However, directors’ motivations have not
been specifically examined. While directors are likely to
have a wide range of reasons to assume corporate direc-
torships (Hambrick et al. 2008), there remains a lack of
clear understanding of their motivation to exert extra effort
to perform their board role. Our theoretical model presents
a mechanism that leads directors to engage in OCB, a form
of engagement that involves intrinsically motivated
actions.
Third, our theoretical model incorporates the multilevel
factors that can affect directors’ motivations not only to
fulfill their board duties but also to engage in OCB. While
each director has his or her own individual source of
motivation, the director is also embedded in the boardroom
environment, which inevitably affects his or her behavior.
By identifying the board-level factors that may influence a
director’s motivations to engage in OCB through role
identities, we attempt to explain why the director is more
likely to engage in OCB under certain board conditions.
Practical Implications
Our research has two important practical implications for
boards. First, our theoretical framework demonstrates that
some directors are more motivated to contribute to the
board by going beyond their formal duties because of their
strong role identity as a director. This finding suggests that
it is not always sufficient to examine the professional
backgrounds of director candidates. As research has shown
that there are strong links between directors’ role identifi-
cation and their governance roles (Capezio et al. 2014; Zhu
and Yoshikawa 2015), it is important for boards to use
survey or other mechanisms to identify highly motivated
directors who can enhance the effective functioning of the
board.
Another implication is that boards can build a culture
that values and supports OCB engagement among their
members. For example, boards in family-controlled orga-
nizations may have a more relational culture in which
board members tend to be recruited based on social ties
with family owners. In such a board culture, directors may
be more inclined to help one another. Additionally, if a
board has established a positive culture that values mem-
bers’ OCB, it is more likely to motivate other members,
especially newly appointed directors, to engage in similar
behaviors. Therefore, a supportive board culture that
appreciates the ‘‘other-serving’’ behavior of its members
can help to raise the level of OCB engagement by its
members.
Limitations and Future Research
There are several avenues for future research to extend our
theoretical model. First, this study presents a parsimonious
model by identifying directors’ role identity and role-
identity alignment as the key antecedents of OCB
engagement. While our study builds on the board literature
that highlights the interrelationship between directors’ role
identity and behavior, we have not included other ante-
cedents, such as directors’ personality traits and other
individual attributes that may influence directors’ OCB.
Future research can include other antecedents that may
affect the degree of a director’s engagement in OCB.
Another limitation of the study is that our model does
not take the CEO-board relationship into consideration. It
is reasonable to believe that a CEO’s personal character
affects how board members engage in their board tasks,
including OCB. The level of (over)confidence, hubris, or
the narcissistic tendency of a CEO (Chatterjee and Ham-
brick 2011; Tang et al. 2015; Zhu and Chen 2014) may also
influence the degree of the directors’ engagement in OCB
through their interaction with the CEO. Focusing on the
CEO-director relationship, Del Brio et al. (2013) examine
how directors’ perceptions of CEOs’ trustworthiness affect
their governance behavior. Because this important factor
will likely impact how directors behave in the boardroom,
future research may consider this relationship in the
research model.
Third, researchers can explore the boundaries of OCB
by examining the types of activities that are usually per-
ceived as OCB in the boardroom. OCB is discretionary
behavior that is not formally rewarded. However, the for-
mal task boundaries of board members are not always clear
cut. Therefore, it would be helpful to advance our under-
standing of what constitutes such discretionary behaviors
and the extent to which board members typically engage in
such behaviors. Because archival data are limited in the
exploration of directors’ behavioral motivation, we believe
that more qualitative work or survey-oriented research
should be undertaken.
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Finally, future studies can explore possible outcomes of
directors’ OCB engagement. For instance, there is a stream
of research that examines the relationships between
boardroom characteristics and firms’ corporate philan-
thropy strategy (Brown et al. 2006; Coffey and Wang 1998;
Wang and Coffey 1992). Some studies report that a firm is
more likely to make corporate donations when its board has
more female directors (Wang and Coffey 1992; Williams
2003). Given that OCB focuses on ‘‘other-serving’’
behavior, will a board with a higher level of OCB
engagement by its members pay greater attention to
stakeholders, such as committing to corporate social
responsibility and/or philanthropic activities? It would be
of interest to explore the types of corporate strategies and
outcomes that OCB can produce for a firm.
Conclusion
The role of the board is becoming increasingly important to
organizations. Prior research has generally focused on
directors’ formal duties, including managerial monitoring
and resource provision. However, some board members,
especially those who have a DRI, are likely to exert greater
efforts in their board role and may even perform beyond
their formal duties by engaging in OCB. As Hambrick et al.
(2008) note, directors’ motivations to serve on the board
are quite interesting because of the rising risk of lawsuits,
increasing responsibilities, and less attractive pay for
highly talented individuals. We have focused on directors’
role identities and the manner in which these affect
directors’ motivation to engage in OCB. There are other
important factors that may motivate directors not only to
fulfill their board duties but also to engage in OCB, and we
hope that our paper will stimulate research on this impor-
tant topic.
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